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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Anthony Araujo filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that he 
was disciplined by New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc. 
(“NJT”) in retaliation for his participation in an activity 
protected by the Federal Rail Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20109 
(“FRSA”).  Specifically, Araujo reported an emotional injury 
after he witnessed a fatal accident on February 25, 2008.  The 
District Court (Judge Stanley R. Chesler) found that the 
discipline was not retaliatory and granted NJT’s motion for 
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summary judgment.  See Araujo v. New Jersey Transit Rail 
Operations, Inc., No. 10-CV-3985, 2012 WL 1044619 
(D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2012).  We will reverse the order of the 
District Court and remand. 
 
I. 
 As this appeal arises from the grant of NJT’s motion 
for summary judgment, we recount the facts contained in the 
record in the light most favorable to Araujo, the non-moving 
party.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 
(1986). 
 
 NJT employs outside contractors to conduct repairs 
and maintenance work on bridges that pass over railroad 
tracks that are electrified by NJT.  They are primarily 
protected from overhead high voltage catenary wires by two 
NJT linemen, and are protected from the movement of other 
trains on the tracks by a conductor-flagman.  Prior to the 
February 25, 2008 accident, it was the practice of linemen not 
to talk to the NJT conductor-flagman about catenary outages.  
Rather, linemen would brief the supervisor of the contractor 
crew about the extent of the electrical catenary outages.  The 
supervisor of the contractor crew would then inform the 
conductor-flagman that the catenary lines were de-energized.  
On the date of the accident, Beaver Construction Company 
(“Beaver Construction”), performed work rehabilitating 
bridges over an electrified NJT track.  The specific area of 
work was on Track 2, in Newark, New Jersey.  NJT 
employed two linemen—Christopher Picton and Jeff 
Meisner—to de-energize the catenary and provide primary 
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protection to the contractors.  Araujo was the conductor-
flagman.  His primary responsibility was to protect 
contractors from oncoming trains. 
 
 The linemen told the Beaver Construction 
superintendent, Nicholas Gilman, that the Beaver 
Construction crew was supposed to work around Track 2, 
near Third Street.  The linemen did not brief Araujo regarding 
the limits of the catenary outage, and Araujo concedes that he 
was not aware of the extent of the catenary outage.  Rather, 
based on his experience as a conductor-flagman, Araujo 
assumed that the catenary was de-energized to the same 
extent as the track was put out of service for the repairs.  He 
had received a Bulletin Order—a document used by NJT to 
describe track outage information—which stated that the 
track was out of service for electrical trains between Broad 
Street and Roseville Avenue, an area which included Seventh 
Street, where the accident occurred.  Araujo, however, was 
mistaken in his assumption that the scope of the catenary de-
energization was the same as the track outage.  The catenary 
de-energization was not controlled by the Bulletin Order, but 
was controlled by another form—the E.T. 102 form—and did 
not extend that far. 
 
 The Beaver Construction crew, accompanied by 
Araujo, commenced its work at the Third Street area of Track 
2.  After the crew completed its work, Araujo believed that 
the construction crew was going to get off of the tracks at the 
Bathgate Avenue exit ramp, which is past Seventh Street.  
The two linemen, Picton and Meisner, did not remain with the 
construction crew, but rather moved to meet the Beaver 
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Construction crew at Bathgate Avenue.  Rather than exiting, 
the Beaver Construction crew foreman, Francis McNeil, 
asked superintendent Gilman for permission for the crew to 
stop at Seventh Street to perform minor repairs. 
 
 According to Araujo, who heard the conversation 
between McNeil and Gilman, Gilman told McNeil that he 
“had the catenary,” meaning that he had signed off on the 
catenary outage with the linemen.  Araujo understood this to 
mean that the catenary was de-energized at Seventh Street.  
According to Araujo, linemen in practice communicated 
catenary outages to a conductor-flagman by relaying the 
information through a construction crew foreman.  Thus, at 
this time, the construction crew, the foreman, and Araujo 
were not aware that the catenary outage did not extend to 
Seventh Street.  Araujo was the only NJT employee that was 
with the construction crew.  The construction crew proceeded 
with repairs, and a construction crew member came in contact 
with the catenary.  He was electrocuted, dying from his 
injuries, which Araujo witnessed. 
 
 Following the accident, NJT Superintendent Joseph 
Meade, who was Araujo’s manager, questioned Araujo at the 
site.  He also interviewed others, who confirmed that Araujo 
had not been briefed about the catenary outage. 
 
 The accident was a Federal Rail Administration 
(“FRA”) reportable incident, and both FRA and NJT rules 
and regulations required NJT to conduct drug tests on any 
employee that it had “reasonable cause” to believe had 
committed rule violations that contributed in any way to the 
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incident.  On the evening of the incident, NJT administered 
drug tests to two lineman—Picton and Meisner—who were 
responsible for protecting the contractors from catenary 
wires, but did not order a drug test for Araujo. 
 
 The following day, Araujo gave a taped statement 
about the incident to NJT.  There was no significant new 
information in that statement.  Araujo also went to NJT’s 
Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) to report symptoms 
that he was experiencing as a result of witnessing the 
accident.  A NJT counselor confirmed that he was medically 
unable to work due to a work-related injury, and informed 
Meade that Araujo could not work.  A work-related medical 
condition that causes an employee to miss work had to be 
reported to the FRA. 
 
 Under the applicable labor relations agreement, NJT 
had ten days from the date of the incident to give employees 
notice of a hearing and investigation (“H&I”) into rule 
violations arising out of the incident.  On March 5, 2008, 
Meade drafted disciplinary charges against Araujo, asserting 
a violation of TRO-3 rules.  The TRO-3 rules require 
conductors to prohibit people under their protection from 
going near the catenary unless the conductor knows for 
certain that the catenary is de-energized.    Meade admitted 
during his deposition that, as of the evening of February 25, 
2008, he was in possession of all of the information on which 
he based the TRO-3 rule violation charges against Araujo.  
He testified, in part: 
 
Q: So what was your basis for deciding to bring 
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the charges?  What information, what facts did 
you rely on? 
 
A: The fact that the individual came in contact 
with the catenary wire showed that there was 
some question on whether [Araujo] followed 
the rules as outlined in TRO-3, 13, 14, 15 and 
101. 
 
Q: You certainly knew that fact as of the 
afternoon of February 25th, 2008, correct? 
 
A: We knew that the incident happened.  We 
weren’t fully advised in-depth of it, which is 
why we set up a hearing and investigation to 
bring all the facts together. 
 
Q: Well, my question to you is— 
 
A: This is not a guilty—this is trying to get all 
the people involved together and ascertain the 
facts to see if indeed he did comply with those 
rules. 
 
Q: Well, why did you suspect or believe that he 
didn’t comply with the rules?  What basis did 
you have to even believe that? 
 
A: Because an individual was injured under his 
protection by coming in contact with the 
catenary. 
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Q: A fact that you knew on February 25, 2008, 
correct? 
 
A: Yes, sir. 
 
(A-789.)  However, Meade also testified that “the fact that we 
charged Mr. Araujo had nothing to do with the fact that we 
didn’t” drug test him, and stated that the decision to charge 
Araujo was made after the initial interview on February 25, 
2008, and required him to read the statements given by 
Picton, Meisner, and other witnesses.  Additionally, the 
record reflects that Araujo was the only conductor-flagman 
that was ever charged with a violation of TRO-3 rules during 
the five years prior to February 25, 2008.  (A-672.) 
 
 On May 22, 2008, NJT ceased paying Araujo’s wages 
on the grounds that Araujo’s injury was a recoverable injury 
under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”).  On 
October 2, 2008, Araujo was cleared to return to work from 
his injury, but he was suspended without pay while the 
charges were pending.  A hearing was held and the 
adjudicating officer found that Araujo violated the TRO-3 
rules.  As a result, Araujo was assessed a time-served 
suspension without pay. 
 
 Araujo thereafter filed a complaint with the 
Occupational Safety & Health Administration (“OSHA”) 
Office of Whistleblower Protection, as required by the FRSA.  
OSHA issued findings in favor of Araujo, and ordered NJT to 
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pay $569,587 in damages, to which NJT objected.
1
  Pursuant 
to the FRSA, Araujo filed this suit in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey.
2
  Following 
discovery, NJT filed a motion for summary judgment, which 
the District Court granted.  This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 49 
U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
                                                 
1
 The award included damages for lost EAP benefits 
($23,350); lost wages ($40,271); pain and suffering ($5,000); 
damage to Araujo’s FICO credit score ($50,000); the loss of 
Araujo’s car, which was repossessed when he could no longer 
make payments ($12,297.08); the loss of Araujo’s home, 
which was foreclosed when he could no longer make 
payments ($345,754.37); punitive damages ($75,000); and 
attorneys’ fees ($17,915).  (A-35.11.)  
2
 The FRSA gives authority to investigate and 
adjudicate whistleblower complaints to the Secretary of 
Labor.  See 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d).  The Secretary of Labor 
has delegated her authority under this provision to the 
Assistant Secretary for OSHA.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1982.104.  
While plaintiffs are required to first lodge a complaint with 
OSHA, the FRSA permits a plaintiff to bring an action in 
federal district court “if the Secretary of Labor has not issued 
a final decision within 210 days after the filing of the 
complaint and if the delay is not due to the bad faith of the 
employee.”  49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3).  Here, the parties agree 
that the statutory prerequisite was met for Araujo to file his 
complaint in District Court. 
 10 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment.  See Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. 
Schoch, 666 F.3d 862, 867 (3d Cir. 2012).  This court can 
affirm a grant of summary judgment only if “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  In making its determination, “the court should view 
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.”  Marzano v. 
Computer Sci. Corp. Inc., 91 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 1996).  
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
 The purpose of the Federal Rail Safety Act (“FRSA”) 
is “to promote safety in every area of railroad operations.”  49 
U.S.C. § 20101.  The FRSA was substantially amended in 
2007 to include anti-retaliation measures.  Prior to the 
passage of the FRSA, whistleblower retaliation complaints by 
railroad carrier employees were subject to mandatory dispute 
resolution pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 
151 et seq.  See generally 75 Fed. Reg. 53,523 (Aug. 31, 
2010).  Congress passed the FRSA amendment in 2007, 
expanding the scope of the anti-retaliation protections and 
providing enforcement authority with the Department of 
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Labor.
3
  Under the newly amended FRSA, a railroad carrier 
“may not discharge, demote, suspend, reprimand, or in any 
other way discriminate against an employee if such 
discrimination is due, in whole or in part” to the employee’s 
engagement in one of numerous protected activities.  49 
U.S.C. § 20109(a).  The protected activities are enumerated in 
the statute, and include notifying the railroad carrier of a 
work-related personal injury or a work-related illness.  Id. § 
20109(a)(4). 
 
B. 
 
 The FRSA incorporates by reference the rules and 
procedures applicable to Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR-21”) 
whistleblower cases.  Id. § 20109(d)(2)(A).  AIR-21 sets forth 
a two-part burden-shifting test.  See id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i)-
(ii).  Since the FRSA was amended to incorporate the AIR-21 
burden-shifting test in 2007, no federal court of appeals has 
                                                 
3
 The legislative history of the bill reflects that the 
changes were intended to “enhance the oversight measures 
that improve transparency and accountability of the railroad 
carriers” and that “[t]he intent of this provision is to ensure 
that employees can report their concerns without the fear of 
possible retaliation or discrimination from employers.”  H.R. 
Rep. No. 110-259 at 348 (2007) (Conf. Rep.).  For discussion 
of the changes, see Santiago v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. 
Co., ARB No. 10-147, slip op. at 12-14; Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. 
Solis, No. 12-0306, 2013 WL 39226, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 
2013).  
 12 
considered its application. 
 
 Under AIR-21, an employee must show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that “(1) she engaged in 
protected activity; (2) the employer knew that she engaged in 
the protected activity; (3) she suffered an unfavorable 
personnel action; and (4) the protected activity was a 
contributing factor in the unfavorable action.”4  Allen v. 
Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 475-76 (5th Cir. 2008).  
Once the plaintiff makes a showing that the protected activity 
was a “contributing factor” to the adverse employment action, 
the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate “by clear 
and convincing evidence, that the employer would have taken 
the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that 
behavior.”  Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii).  The Department of 
Labor has promulgated regulations that adopt this burden-
shifting standard to FRSA complaints filed with the 
Department of Labor.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1982.104(e)(3)-(4). 
 
 In the past, we have found that if a statute does not 
provide for a burden-shifting scheme, McDonnell Douglas 
applies as the default burden-shifting framework.
5
  See Doyle 
                                                 
4
 This case is only concerned with the fourth AIR-21 
requirement—whether the protected activity was a 
contributing factor to the adverse employment action.  Both 
parties concede that Araujo engaged in a protected activity; 
that NJT knew that Araujo engaged in a protected activity; 
and that Araujo suffered an adverse employment action. 
5
 The McDonnell Douglas framework is a three-step burden-
shifting test that was laid out by the Supreme Court in 
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v. United States Sec’y of Labor, 285 F.3d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 
2002).  This implies that when a burden-shifting framework 
other than McDonnell Douglas is present in a statute, 
Congress specifically intended to alter any presumption that 
McDonnell Douglas is applicable.  The FRSA is clear that 
AIR-21 burden-shifting applies.  However, in this case, the 
District Court noted that it was unable to locate any binding 
authority regarding burden-shifting, and discussed both 
McDonnell Douglas and the regulations promulgated by the 
Department of Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 1982.104(e)(4), which 
implement the AIR-21 framework.  Araujo, 2012 WL 
1044619, at *5. 
 
 Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it did not 
need to determine whether McDonnell Douglas applied, or 
for that matter, whether the AIR-21 framework is distinct 
from the McDonnell Douglas framework, as according to the 
District Court, Araujo could not satisfy his burden under 
                                                                                                             
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
The steps have been summarized as follows: “Under 
McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the 
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for its employment action. If the employer meets this burden, 
the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears, but 
the plaintiff can still prove disparate treatment by, for 
instance, offering evidence demonstrating that the employer's 
explanation is pretextual.”  Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 
U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003) (citations omitted). 
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either standard.  We disagree with this approach.  The District 
Court apparently did not recognize that, in fact, the FRSA 
explicitly incorporates the AIR-21 burden-shifting by 
reference.  See id. (“The parties have not presented any 
binding authority to the Court concerning how to evaluate the 
viability of a FRSA whistleblower claim, nor has the Court’s 
own research uncovered any reported cases dealing with 
FRSA retaliation claims.”).  Unquestionably, AIR-21 burden-
shifting applies to cases brought under the FRSA. 
 
 It is necessary for us to interpret the FRSA burden-
shifting scheme.  Statutory analysis begins with the plain 
language of the statute, “the language employed by 
Congress.”  Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 
(1982) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 
(1979)) (internal quotations omitted).  This Court must give 
effect to the intent of Congress by giving these words their 
“ordinary meaning.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).  
Considering the plain meaning of the statute, FRSA burden-
shifting is much more protective of plaintiff-employees than 
the McDonnell Douglas framework.  The plaintiff-employee 
need only show that his protected activity was a “contributing 
factor” in the retaliatory discharge or discrimination, not the 
sole or even predominant cause.  See 49 U.S.C. § 
42121(b)(2)(B)(ii).  In other words, “a contributing factor is 
any factor, which alone or in combination with other factors, 
tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.”  
Ameristar Airways, Inc. v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 650 F.3d 563, 
567 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Allen, 514 F.3d at 476 n.3 
(internal quotation omitted). 
 
 15 
 The term “contributing factor” is a term of art that has 
been elaborated upon in the context of other whistleblower 
statutes.  The Federal Circuit noted the following in a 
Whistleblower Protection Act case: 
 
The words “a contributing factor” . . . mean any 
factor which, alone or in connection with other 
factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome 
of the decision. This test is specifically intended 
to overrule existing case law, which requires a 
whistleblower to prove that his protected 
conduct was a “significant”, “motivating”, 
“substantial”, or “predominant” factor in a 
personnel action in order to overturn that action. 
Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) (quoting 135 Cong. Rec. 5033 (1989) (Explanatory 
Statement on S. 20)) (emphasis added by Federal Circuit).  
Furthermore, an employee “need not demonstrate the 
existence of a retaliatory motive on the part of the employee 
taking the alleged prohibited personnel action in order to 
establish that his disclosure was a contributing factor to the 
personnel action.”  Marano, 2 F.3d at 1141 (emphasis in 
original); see also Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 
750 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A prima facie case does not require that 
the employee conclusively demonstrate the employer’s 
retaliatory motive.”). 
 
 Once the employee asserts a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate, “by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the employer would have taken the 
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same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that 
behavior.”  49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii).  The “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard is the intermediate burden of 
proof, in between “a preponderance of the evidence” and 
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  See Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).  To meet the burden, the employer 
must show that “the truth of its factual contentions are highly 
probable.”  Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 
(1984) (internal quotation omitted).  
 
 It is worth emphasizing that the AIR-21 burden-
shifting framework that is applicable to FRSA cases is much 
easier for a plaintiff to satisfy than the McDonnell Douglas 
standard.  As the Eleventh Circuit noted in a case under the 
Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, a statute that 
uses a similar burden-shifting framework, “[f]or employers, 
this is a tough standard, and not by accident.”  Stone & 
Webster Eng’g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1572 (11th 
Cir. 1997).  The Eleventh Circuit stated that the standard is 
“tough” because Congress intended for companies in the 
nuclear industry to “face a difficult time defending 
themselves,” due to a history of whistleblower harassment 
and retaliation in the industry.  Id.  The 2007 FRSA 
amendments must be similarly construed, due to the history 
surrounding their enactment.  We note, for example, that the 
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure held a 
hearing to “examine allegations . . . suggesting that railroad 
safety management programs sometimes either subtly or 
overtly intimidate employees from reporting on-the-job-
injuries.”  (Impact of Railroad Injury, Accident, and 
Discipline Policies on the Safety of America’s Railroads: 
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Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, 110th Cong. (Oct. 22, 2007)).  As the Majority 
Staff of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
noted to members of the Committee: 
 
The accuracy of rail safety databases has been 
heavily criticized in a number of government 
reports over the years.  The primary issue 
identified in many previous government 
investigations is that the rail industry has a long 
history of underreporting incidents and 
accidents in compliance with Federal 
regulations.  The underreporting of railroad 
employee injuries has long been a particular 
problem, and railroad labor organizations have 
frequently complained that harassment of 
employees who reported injuries is a common 
railroad management practice. 
 
Id.
6
  The report noted that one of the reasons that pressure is 
put on railroad employees not to report injuries is the 
compensation system; some railroads base supervisor 
                                                 
6
 See also id. (Introductory Remarks of Rep. Oberstar) 
(“Reports have documented a long history of under-reporting 
of accidents, under-reporting incidents, of noncompliance 
with Federal regulations; and under-reporting of rail injuries 
is significant because employees frequently report that 
harassment of those who do report incidents, being hurt on 
the job, is a common practice in the rail sector.”.) 
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compensation, in part, on the number of employees under 
their supervision that report injuries to the Federal Railroad 
Administration.  Id.  We will leave our discussion of the 
legislative history here, as the AIR-21 burden-shifting 
language is clear, and “[w]here the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the court should not consider statutory purpose 
or legislative history.”  See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 
599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010).  We simply note this 
history to emphasize that, as it did with other statutes that 
utilize the “contributing factor” and “clear and convincing 
evidence” burden-shifting framework, Congress intended to 
be protective of plaintiff-employees. 
 
C. 
 
 We must now apply AIR-21 burden-shifting.  First, 
Araujo must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
his reporting of his injury was a “contributing factor” to 
NJT’s decision to discipline him.  If he can do so, NJT must 
show by “clear and convincing evidence” that it would still 
have disciplined him, absent the reported injury.  The District 
Court held that Araujo “cannot establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation because the record lacks evidence from which a 
reasonable factfinder could infer that the protected activity—
Araujo’s reports of employee injury—was a contributing 
factor in NJT’s decision to discipline Araujo for the Electrical 
Operating Rules he violated in the February 25, 2008 
incident.”  Araujo, 2012 WL 1044619, at *6. 
 
 But, Araujo identifies some evidence in the record that 
tends to show that his decision to report a workplace injury 
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was a contributing factor to NJT’s decision to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings against him.  His evidence 
principally falls into two categories: (a) temporal proximity 
and (b) adverse disparate treatment.  While this Court notes 
that the evidence that Araujo proffers is certainly not 
overwhelming, we part ways with the District Court, and hold 
that it is sufficient to assert a prima facie case. 
 
 Temporal proximity between the employee’s 
engagement in a protected activity and the unfavorable 
personnel action can be circumstantial evidence that the 
protected activity was a contributing factor to the adverse 
employment action.  See Kewley v. Dep’t of Health and 
Human Servs., 153 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting 
that, under the Whistleblower Protection Act, “the 
circumstantial evidence of knowledge of the protected 
disclosure and a reasonable relationship between the time of 
the protected disclosure and the time of the personnel action 
will establish, prima facie, that the disclosure was a 
contributing factor to the personnel action”) (internal 
quotation omitted).  Araujo is able to show evidence of 
temporal proximity by marshalling the following facts in the 
record.  On February 25, 2008 (the night of the accident), 
Meade decided not to drug test Araujo, despite the fact that he 
was legally required to drug test Araujo if he suspected that 
he had violated a rule or contributed to the accident.  On that 
night, Meade had drug tests administered to Picton and 
Meisner.  On the next day, February 26, 2008, Araujo went to 
NJT’s EAP Counselor to report that he was experiencing 
symptoms related to the incident.  Araujo was deemed unable 
to work due to the work-related injury.  A few days after 
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Araujo reported the injury, Meade filed disciplinary charges 
against Araujo.  Araujo contends—and the record provides 
support—that Meade had all of the information related to 
Araujo’s involvement on February 25, 2008, and duly, cause 
to drug test him if he had thought it necessary.  
 
 NJT provides at least three reasons that this Court 
should disregard the temporal proximity.  First, Meade 
testified that “the fact that we charged Mr. Araujo had 
nothing to do with the fact that we didn’t” drug test him, and 
stated that the decision to charge Araujo came later, after he 
had read the statements given by Picton, Meisner, and other 
witnesses.  NJT also notes that Araujo was actually charged 
before Picton and Meisner.  Additionally, NJT emphasizes 
that under the applicable collective bargaining agreement, 
NJT had only ten days from the incident to give Araujo notice 
of a hearing and investigation.  Thus, according to NJT, the 
temporal proximity was present “by necessity,” due to the 
agreement.  (Appellee’s Br. at 21.) 
 
 Araujo also points to disparate treatment as 
circumstantial evidence that his protected activity was a 
contributing factor to his adverse employment action.  
Specifically, Araujo points to the fact that, in the five years 
preceding the February 25, 2008 incident, no other conductor-
flagmen were disciplined for violating the TRO-3 rules.  
According to Araujo, prior to the accident, it was common 
practice for conductor-flagmen not to talk to the linemen, and 
thus be unaware of the extent of the catenary power outages.  
NJT responds, asserting that Araujo was not treated 
disparately as compared to Picton and Meisner, who were 
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disciplined for their conduct during the accident.  NJT also 
asserts that Araujo should not be compared to other 
conductor-flagmen, because Araujo is the only conductor-
flagman to ever allow a contractor to come into contact with a 
live catenary while under his protection. 
 
 Considering all of the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Araujo, we conclude that Araujo has asserted a 
prima facie case.  With respect to Araujo’s temporal 
proximity argument, Araujo’s evidence is entirely 
circumstantial, and he does not provide any evidence about 
NJT’s motive.  But direct evidence is not required.  See 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (noting, 
in the context of Title VII employment discrimination cases, 
that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may 
also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct 
evidence”).  Thus, Araujo is not required to provide evidence 
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of motive.
7
  See Marano, 2 F.3d at 1141 (noting, in a case 
under the Whistleblower Protection Act, that an employee 
“need not demonstrate the existence of a retaliatory motive on 
the part of the employee taking the alleged prohibited 
personnel action in order to establish that his disclosure was a 
contributing factor to the personnel action” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 
 Viewing the facts favorably to Araujo, a reasonable 
jury could find that Meade decided not to drug test Araujo on 
February 25, 2008 because he did not believe that he violated 
any rules or was responsible for the accident, and that NJT 
decided to file disciplinary charges only after Araujo reported 
his injury.  Certainly, this evidence is not overwhelming.  We 
note that the District Court found that this theory suffers from 
a “critical flaw” in that it conflates the protocol for drug 
testing with the internal process by which NJT investigates 
                                                 
7
 We note that the fact that an employee need not 
ascribe a motive to the employer greatly reduces an 
employee’s burden in making a prima facie case.  However, 
we believe that this reduced burden is appropriate in FRSA 
cases.  We note, for example, that the legislative history 
shows that Congress was concerned that some railroad 
supervisors intimidated employees from reporting injuries to 
the FRA, in part, because their compensation depended on 
low numbers of FRA reportable injuries within their 
supervisory area.  (Impact of Railroad Injury, Accident, and 
Discipline Policies on the Safety of America’s Railroads: 
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, 110th Cong. (Oct. 22, 2007)).   
 23 
and enforces safety rule violations.  Araujo, 2012 WL 
1044619, at *7.  Thus, the District Court found that, “[t]aken 
to its logical extreme, Araujo’s position would preclude NJT 
from disciplining any employee through its hearing and 
investigation procedure if it decided not to subject that 
employee to a drug and alcohol test in the immediate 
aftermath of an incident involving an employee injury.”  Id.  
While we agree that the District Court pointed out a potential 
flaw in Araujo’s theory, viewing the facts in a light favorable 
to Araujo, whether Araujo’s theory suffers from a “critical 
flaw,” or whether retaliation was a contributing factor to 
NJT’s disciplinary decision, is an issue of fact that should be 
properly considered by a jury, not by the District Court. 
 
We reach the same conclusion with regards to 
Araujo’s disparate treatment arguments, in which Araujo 
argues that (a) his conduct did not deviate from the general 
practice of conductor-flagmen at the time and (b) other 
conductor-flagmen were not disciplined for violating the 
TRO-3 rules.  The District Court accepted NJT’s arguments 
that (a) Araujo should be compared to Picton and Meisner, 
both of whom were disciplined and (b) Araujo should not be 
compared to other conductor-flagmen since they were not 
involved in fatal accidents.  Considering all of the evidence in 
the record, NJT’s arguments fail to refute Araujo’s assertion 
that his actions were in line with NJT practice at the time of 
the accident.  If we view the facts in the light most favorable 
to Araujo, conductor-flagmen generally were not aware of the 
extent of catenary outages.  Thus, Araujo is not comparable to 
Picton and Meisner, as both are linemen who were 
responsible for the catenary.  Similarly, while Araujo may 
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have been the only conductor-flagman to have been on duty 
during a fatal accident, it is not appropriate to put him in a 
class by himself, and not compare him to other conductor-
flagmen who did not know about catenary outages but were 
not on duty during fatal accidents.  Applying the employee-
friendly AIR-21 standard, Araujo has stated a prima facie 
case of retaliation. 
 
 Having found that Araujo made a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to NJT to show by “clear and convincing 
evidence” that it would have disciplined Araujo in the 
absence of his decision to report his injury.  The District 
Court found that, assuming that Araujo could state a prima 
facie case, NJT was able to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that it would have disciplined him anyway.  NJT 
appears to make two categories of arguments in an attempt to 
show clear and convincing evidence.  First, as discussed in 
the preceding section, NJT attempts to rebut many of 
Araujo’s proffered arguments.  Second, NJT provides 
independent evidence that Araujo did in fact violate the TRO-
3 rules.  We conclude that NJT is unable to sustain its steep 
burden. 
 
 NJT attempts to rebut Araujo’s proffered facts with 
respect to temporal proximity and disparate treatment.  For 
the reasons discussed above, NJT’s rebuttals to Araujo’s 
arguments do not provide “clear and convincing evidence.”  
We note that the result may be different if the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework was applicable to this 
claim.  Under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only 
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the 
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action.  We need not decide whether NJT’s responses to 
Araujo’s arguments are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons 
for NJT’s decision to discipline Araujo.  We note this solely 
to emphasize the steep burden that employers face under the 
AIR-21 burden-shifting framework. 
 
 NJT also attempts to provide “clear and convincing 
evidence” by making a case that Araujo was actually in 
violation of the TRO-3 rules.  NJT points to evidence in the 
record that Araujo was aware that the TRO-3 rules broadly do 
not permit NJT employees to allow people under their 
protection near the catenary unless the employee knows for 
certain that the catenary is de-energized.  (Appellee’s Br. at 
8.)  Further, Araujo admitted that he was not aware whether 
the catenary was energized before the accident.  NJT points 
out that Araujo correctly answered a question on an exam in 
2006, showing that he knew that a conductor-flagman 
protecting contractors can allow the contractor to work on an 
overhead bridge in electrified territory only when the Class 
“A” employee reports to the conductor-flagman that the 
catenary is de-energized and partially grounded.  (Appellee’s 
Br. at 10.) 
 
 The District Court found that this evidence of Araujo’s 
actual violation of the TRO-3 rules presented “clear and 
convincing evidence” that NJT’s actions were not retaliatory.  
See Araujo, 2012 WL 1044619, at *9 (“[T]he evidence in the 
record demonstrates that discipline was legitimately imposed 
on Araujo as a result of his violation of several electrical 
safety rules with tragic consequences.”).  We disagree.  While 
the facts in the record may show that Araujo was technically 
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in violation of written rules, they do not shed any light on 
whether NJT’s decision to file disciplinary charges was 
retaliatory.  As discussed, Araujo argues that he was 
following the practice that all conductor-flagmen followed at 
the time, and that NJT had never previously disciplined any 
conductor-flagmen for TRO-3 rule violations.  While Araujo 
does not concede that he violated the letter of the TRO-3 
rules, there is evidence in the record that Araujo did not know 
the extent of the catenary outage and was the only NJT 
employee directly supervising the contractors prior to the 
accident.  Assuming for a moment that Araujo violated the 
letter of the TRO-3 rules, Araujo nevertheless argues that 
NJT’s actual on-the-ground practices differed from the 
written rules, and NJT acknowledged this by never enforcing 
the rules against conductor-flagmen.  Viewing Araujo’s 
argument in this context, NJT’s arguments that Araujo 
committed an actual violation of the letter of the TRO-3 rules 
does not shed any light on whether NJT’s decision to enforce 
these rules against a conductor-flagman for the first time was 
retaliatory. 
 
 We emphasize that Araujo has not articulated an 
overwhelming case of retaliation.  He has not, for example, 
proffered any evidence that NJT dissuaded him from 
reporting his injury or expressed animus at him for doing so.  
Araujo’s evidence is entirely circumstantial, and we express 
no opinion as to the strength of his evidence.  We only note 
that by amending the FRSA, Congress expressed an intent to 
be protective of plaintiff-employees.  Applying the AIR-21 
burden-shifting framework, Araujo has shown enough to 
survive NJT’s motion for summary judgment.  
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V. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the March 
28, 2012 order of the District Court, and remand to the 
District Court for further proceedings. 
